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Taxation-Fire Insurance Premium-Deductibility in Year of
Payment by Cash Basis Taxpayer
The problem of whether a cash basis taxpayer may deduct in the year
of payment the full premium on a fire insurance policy which covers a
period of more than one year or whether he must prorate the deduction
over the term of the policy has been troublesome to the courts and to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
In Waldheim Realty and Investment Co. v. Commissioner,' the tax-
payer corporation had purchased single-premium policies covering a
number of years and had deducted the full premium on each policy as a
business expense in the year of payment. The corporation kept its books
and made its tax return on a cash basis and had since 1905 uniformly
treated such insurance premiums as business expense in the year paid.
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and assessed a deficiency.
The Eighth Circuit held that the corporation could deduct the premiums
in the years paid and was not required to prorate the premiums over the
years of coverage.
The problem had its beginning in 1934, when the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue ruled that a cash basis taxpayer could deduct only the
pro rata portion of the insurance in the year of payment.2 In 1938, the
First Circuit decided in Welch v. De Bloiss that a prepaid premium on
a policy running several years was deductible in its entire amount in the
year of payment by a cash basis taxpayer. The Commissioner accepted
the decision and revoked the ruling made in 1934. Welch v. De Blois
was overruled in 1942 by Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n5
The Commissioner then revoked his ruling of 1938 and reverted to his
original position requiring proration. 6 Now comes the Waldheim
Realty and Investment Co. case. Will the Commissioner revoke the
1943 ruling and issue one similar to the one of 1938?
These three cases are the only ones found where appellate courts
have decided the question of deductibility of fire insurance premiums by
a taxpayer who files on the cash basis. It is interesting to note that
in each of these cases the court upheld the method of accounting em-
ployed by the taxpayer.
The cash basis taxpayer reports income in the year received and
deductions in the year paid, whereas the accrual basis taxpayer reports
income in the year earned and deductions in the year in which the ex-
pense is incurred.7 It can readily be seen that the accrual method
1245 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1957).
2 G.C.M. 13148, XXIII-1 Cum. BuLL. 67 (1934).
294 F.2d 842 (lst Cir. 1938). 'G.C.M. 20307, 1938-1 Cum. BULL. 157.
5131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942). 6 G.C.M. 23587, 1943 Cum. BnuL. 213.
7 The methods of accounting specifically permitted by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 446 (c), are not limited to the cash and accrual basis. This section also allows
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presents a more accurate reflection of income in terms of economic gain.
The cash method falls short of being a perfect measure of income be-
cause generally at the end of a taxable year some amounts due the tax-
payer will not have been collected and some amounts owed by him will
not have been paid. But this method has the virtue of simplicity.
In the field of deductions generally, a departure from a strict ap-
plication of the cash method is made (1) when the disbursement is a
capital one and (2) when, even though an ordinary expense, allowance
of deduction in the year of payment would distort income. Once an
outlay is determined to be a capital expenditure, the deduction of the
entire amount in the year of payment is disallowed on the grounds that
the Code permits only a deduction for depreciation or amortization over
the useful life of the asset which is acquired. There will be no decrease
in the economic wealth of the taxpayer if the value of the asset acquired
equals his expenditure. A clear example of a capital outlay is the
purchase of a building.
The court in Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n said that it
could find no basis for distinguishing between prepaid rentals, which
have been held to be a capital expense,8 and prepaid insurance, and
that by treating prepaid insurance as a capital expense it was obtaining
some degree of consistency.9 But in Waldheim Realty and Investment
Co. v. Commissioner the idea that prepaid insurance was a capital asset
was rejected, although the court conceded that prepaid rent was a
capital asset. Why would these two disbursements require different tax
treatment? The court said:
The payment of insurance premiums adds nothing to the tax-
payer's plant or equipment or his ability to produce income.
In this respect the insurance premium differs from prepaid rent
... as such expenditures [rent] are for the purpose of providing
the taxpayer the place in which to carry on his business.10
One important objective of business firms in purchasing fire insurance
coverage is the assurance that if fire does occur the insurance proceeds
will enable them to restore their premises to a condition proper for
"any other method permitted by this chapter," such as the completed contract and
installment method, and "any combination of foregoing methods permitted under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate."
8 Galatoire Bros. v. Lines, 23 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1928) (rent paid in advance
for forty-five months gave rise to a capital asset) ; J. Alland & Bros., Inc. v. United
States, 28 F.2d 792 (D. Mass. 1928) (three and one-half year lease was a capital
asset). Both of these decisions relied upon Duffy v. Central R.R., 268 U.S. 55(1925), where the Court held that amounts expended for improvements by a lessee
to comply with the provisions of long term leases were capital investments and
therefore not deductible in the year the expenditures were made.0 131 F.2d at 968.
10 245 F.2d at 825.
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business purposes. If so, the court's distinction between prepaid rent
and prepaid insurance seems vulnerable.
The second ground on which a departure from the strict cash method
may be placed is prevention of distortion of net taxable income. The
revenue laws have long provided as a general rule that the taxable
income shall be computed under the method of accounting regularly used
by the taxpayer in keeping his books provided it clearly reflects income..'
The court in the principal case cited Security Flour Mills Co. v. Com-
missioner,12 which stated: "This [failure clearly to reflect income] must
mean distortion of true income, not of a given year, but in the'light of
ultimate gain, from a series of transactions over a period of years, grow-
ing out of, or in some way related to an initial transaction in the taxable
year." '3  Welch v. De Blois held that the phrase "clearly reflects in-
come" only means that the taxpayer's books should be kept fairly and
accurately. However, in Caldwell v. Commissioner,1 4 the court held
that this phrase meant that the income should be reflected with as much
accuracy as standard methods of accounting practice permit.
In determining whether the cash basis taxpayer should be allowed the
full premium deduction in the year of payment, two conflicting interests
must be weighed. On the one hand, Congress had authorized the use of
the cash basis, which does have the virtue of simplicity. A taxpayer
who keeps his books on the cash basis should not be put to the labor and
expense of adjusting his books to prorate his expenses. On the other
hand, it is desirable to limit the taxpayer's power of selecting the year
in which the deduction would be most profitable to him if such would
not clearly reflect income. Somewhere between these two, a line is to
be drawn. Ordinarily, the deduction in the year of payment of a three
year premium distorts income.' 5 Is its inaccuracy great enough to out-
weigh the advantage of its simplicity of computation?
The rule that an expenditure must be prorated because total de-
I' Waldheim Realty and Investment Co. v. Commissioner was decided under
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 41, 53 STAT. 24 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446(a),(b)). The 1939 Code provided:
"The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual ac-
counting period . . . in accordance with the method of accounting regularly em-
ployed in keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting
has been so employed, or if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income,
the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of
the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income."
The language of § 41 first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1921, § 212 (b), 42
STAT. 237, and remained unchanged until the 1954 Code. It was incorporated in
the 1954 Code with minor changes in wording.
12 321 U.S. 281 (1944).
11 Id. at 287.
14202 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1953).
" Conceivably, there could be a situation in which the deduction of a three year
premium payment would not distort income. If a taxpayer had three insurance
policies, each requiring the same amount of premium for a three year period, the
payment of one policy premium annually would not distort income.
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duction in one year would result in distorting taxable income has been
applied to prepayment of rentals,'0 bonuses for the acquisition of leases,
17
bonuses for the cancellation of leases,' 8 and commissions for negotiating
leases.19 On the other hand, it has been held that prepaid interest is
deductible in the year paid by a cash basis taxpayer.20
It is unfortunate that the courts have reached numerous conflicting
decisions on matters that should be kept uniform, simple, and clear.
It is submitted that there should be no difference in the tax treatment
of a three year prepayment of fire insurance premium, interest, or rent.
RICHARD J. TUGGrAr
Taxation-Stock Purchase Agreements-Life Insurance
Premiums as Constructive Dividends
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 defined the term "dividend" as
"any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders, whether in
money or in other property, (1) out of its earnings and profits ac-
cumulated after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of the earnings or profits
of the taxable year .... . 1  With a slight change, this definition has been
repeated in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2
In Sanders v. Fox3 it was held that premiums paid by a closely held
corporation for life insurance policies on the lives of the stockholders
were taxable as dividends to the stockholders in proportion to their hold-
ings.4  The policies had been taken out pursuant to an agreement be-
tween the corporation and stockholders providing that the corporation
would insure each stockholder and that the proceeds would be used to
buy the shares of a deceased stockholder.8 The agreement recited that
the insured would designate the beneficiary, but that the corporation
would be considered the owner of the policies during the lifetime of the
16 Baton Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 469 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 284
U.S. 674 (1931).
Home Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1933).
Steele-Wedeles Co., 30 B.T.A. 841 (1934); Harriet B. Borland, 27 B.T.A.
538 (1933).
1 Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 690 (1932).
2" John D. Fackler, 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939) (three year payment) ; Court Holding
Co., 2 T.C. 531 (1943), rezld on other grounds, 143 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1944),
rev'd without discussion. of this point, 324 U.S. 331 (1945) ; Joseph H. Konigsberg,
P-H 1946 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 46024 (five year payment).
IInt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(a), 53 STAT. 46 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 316).
2 Ibid.
2149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957).
' "The Corporation did not claim the premiums as a deduction for income tax
purposes, but accounted for these premiums as an asset on its balance sheet." Id.
at 945.
'The consideration given by the stockholder was his promise not to sell his
stock except as specified in the agreement.
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